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Abstract
This paper describes and analyzes the 2016 general election results in
Illinois and compares those results to the 2012 and 2008 presidential elections.
The primary unit of analysis in this paper is the 102 counties in Illinois and the
aggregate vote results at the state and county level. Those aggregate data voting
returns are supplemented with statewide survey data taken from the Paul Simon
Institute’s periodic polls which allows an individual voter level of analysis to add
to the aggregate data.
The paper also takes account of modern political science’s developing
narrative about what is happening geographically inside individual states and
nationally in an era of deep partisan and ideological polarization coupled with the
long term effects of the realignment of the nation’s two major parties and the
recurring political map which has evolved over the past three decades. The
interaction and tension between the popular vote and the Electoral College vote
was the dominant and determining feature of the 2016 election results. No other
modern democracy has a national election system comparable to our use of the
Electoral College as the final arbiter of who will be elected to the most powerful
office in the world. The election of 2016 produced a disparity between the
Electoral College and the popular vote and it was the second time this occurred
out of the five presidential elections held in the 21st Century. This time, the
discrepancy between the two outcomes was the largest in American history. This
disparity makes an even more salient and compelling story than what would have
already been a dramatic tale of the epic battle between Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump. They were two of the most diametrically different candidates to ever seek
the American presidency and archetypes of the life-long political professional
versus the totally inexperienced newcomer and outsider both of which are
becoming the norm in other battles for governor, senator and mayor across the
United States.
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Introduction
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton is a native daughter of Illinois and the first woman to gain
the presidential nomination of a major American party. She was born in Chicago
and raised in Park Ridge a middle class suburb of Chicago, she finished high school
before going off to Wellesley for college. She then attended law school at Yale
where she met Bill Clinton. After law school she followed Bill Clinton to his native
Arkansas where they both taught at the University of Arkansas School of Law in
Fayetteville from which he launched his political career and climb to state and
then national office. Hillary Clinton’s political career was built first in Arkansas
for eighteen years and then in Washington, D. C. for eight years as First Lady in Bill
Clinton’s two administrations (Clinton, 2003).
Clinton then struck out on her own right, moving to New York in 2000 and
winning the Senate seat there vacated by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. She won a
second term in 2006 by a sixty-seven percent margin. Soon thereafter Clinton
launched her own bid to win the Democratic nomination for president in 2008.
She lost that nomination race after a long, contentious and protracted struggle
with Barack Obama, also from Illinois, who not only bested Clinton in the primary
contest but also went on to beat Republican John McCain in the general election
of 2008 (See: Jackson, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2013 and other books on 2008
including, Heilmann and Halperin, 2010, Balz and Johnson, 2009; Ceaser, Busch,
and Pitney, 2009; Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, 2008).
Clinton then took on a larger role on the national stage in 2009 when
President Obama offered her the position of Secretary of State in his first
administration, one of the four most important cabinet positions in any
administration. At the time Obama’s offer to Clinton to be his Secretary of State
led many observers to draw comparisons with that other famous Illinois
president, Abraham Lincoln, when he assembled his first cabinet from “A Team of
Rivals” (Kerns Goodman, 2005).
As Secretary of State, Clinton’s political reach and her personal image and
brand were then burnished, and ultimately bruised, by those four very high
profile years as the nation’s most senior diplomat and a leading voice especially
for women and children on the world stage. When she left that office in 2013
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65% of Americans held a favorable image of her (The Economist, October 22,
2016, 22). Her standing with world opinion was similarly high as polls taken in
other nations found her to be one of the most admired women in the world.
Two years later she launched another bid to gain the Democratic
nomination and the White House. By then several highly publicized and
contentious public hearings had been held by the Congress on the Benghazi
tragedy where four Americans, including the U. S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris
Stevens, had died. Clinton’s critics examined the incident in minute detail with
probing questions about the State Department and Clinton’s personal
involvement in that tragedy. As one of the ancillary results of those hearings
Clinton’s favorable ratings declined precipitously in the wake of the constant
drumbeat of negative publicity directed toward her. She began her quest for the
Democratic nomination and run for the White House with a long history of public
service and accomplishments but also carrying a load of political and personal
baggage as well.
This paper will attempt to analyze how Clinton was able to build on the
Obama record and coalition in Illinois, a state where they both could claim
political roots and a state which has repeatedly been found to be one of the most
typical in the nation (Ohlemacher, 2007). It will also show how Clinton’s victory in
Illinois in 2012, when compared to Obama’s wins in 2008 and 2012, illustrates
graphically both the strengths and weaknesses of both major parties in Illinois and
throughout the United States as the nation contemplates a new era of unified
Republican control under the leadership of Donald Trump. A basic contention of
this paper is that the Clinton/Trump results in Illinois are a template for what
happened in the entire nation in the 2016 presidential election. In addition, the
trends which have been underway in Illinois at least since the turn of the 21st
Century and the election of 2000 came to full fruition in the 2016 results and
indicate quite cogently what is also happening in the nation as a whole. In short,
Illinois is a bellwether and its politics an algorithm for understanding the electoral
tides which moved the country to elect Trump president with 304 Electoral
College votes while Clinton received a popular vote margin of almost 3 million
votes (Calfas, December 20, 2016). This paper will explore and attempt to explain
how that anomalous result occurred and what it says about the deep divisions
which exist in American politics today.
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Donald Trump
Donald J. Trump became the Republican Party’s nominee after a brutal and
hard fought battle which started with seventeen major candidates declared for
the Republican nomination. He, of course, also went on to become the 45th
president of the United States. One could hardly have scripted a more
improbable scenario for Trump’s march to the nomination and then the
presidency. Trump’s competitors included both sitting governors Chris Christie,
from New Jersey, John Kasich, of Ohio, and Scott Walker of Wisconsin and former
governors Jeb Bush of Florida, Mike Huckabee, of Arkansas, George Pataki of New
York, Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, and James Gilmore of Virginia. (Most of this
section is taken from an earlier paper I did on the nominations process. See:
Jackson, 2015). It also included most prominently, several young and ambitious
first term senators, Ted Cruz of Texas, Marco Rubio of Florida and Rand Paul of
Kentucky. The only veteran U.S. Senator running was Lindsay Graham whose
campaign had a hard time getting started and did not last long. From the private
sector there were two newcomers beside Trump, Ben Carson a retired
neurosurgeon from Ohio and Carly Fiorina, a business woman from California.
The three candidates who had no prior governmental experience ran on
their business and professional achievements. They also pledged to “run
government like a business,” which is an always popular mantra in American
politics no matter how unrealistic and inappropriate the analogy may be (Joyce,
December 14, 2016). Of those three, however, two fell by the wayside rather
early while Trump rode a wave of alleged voter anger and desire for a change to a
most unlikely victory, first in the nominations contest against mostly veteran
Republican opposition and then against Clinton, arguably the candidate with the
most high level governmental experience in the modern era of presidential
politics. This paper tells the story of how Clinton won Illinois, but it also tells the
obverse side of the coin, that is how Trump won the country while losing most of
the urban areas and many of the big states like Illinois. The big urban Rust Belt
states that Trump won, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, were keys
to his victory. Those states resemble Illinois in their basic geographic and
demographic patterns although the Democrats retained Illinois while failing in
those other very similar states.
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The perennial narrative of the American people being ‘fed up” with
Washington and longing for an “outsider” not from Washington, was advanced
early and often by all of the candidates who were not currently in federal office
and repeated faithfully and uncritically by the mass media. No one delivered that
message better than Trump who rode to victory on his pledge to “drain the
swamp” of Washington if he was elected. Most pundits and those who study
presidential campaigns failed to recognize just how virulent this quest for an
outsider, or a change agent, would turn out to be first in the nominations race
and then in the general election.
The media and all the Republican candidates talked a lot about the desire
for a change and the anger of some Americans although just what they were
supposed to be angry about was ill-defined. The nest of issues related to
globalization of the economy, loss of American jobs because of international
trade, and fear of immigrants usually topped the list. Fear of domestic terrorism
was also a major issue and that fear was intimately tangled up with the
immigration control issue. Trump seized on these themes and developed a motto
promising to “Make America Great Again” and a complete narrative around how
being tough in general and being smart and aggressive in negotiations with our
allies and enemies alike could accomplish that promise.
This narrative about how the nation was weak and falling behind our
competitors for a lack of good leadership found a responsive popular audience
and carried Trump through the Republican primaries and the general election
contest with Clinton all the way to the Oval Office. He was the most
unconventional and inexperienced candidate to win the nomination of a major
party, let alone the presidency, in American history. This paper explores how
Trump won it all nationally while losing to Clinton in Illinois and what this pattern
of wins and losses tells us about the shape of the divided electorate and polarized
American politics here near the end of the second decade of the 21st Century.
Trump was a real estate entrepreneur who had inherited a small fortune
from his father (The remainder of this section taken from Jackson, 2016, 11). He
parlayed that inheritance into a much larger real estate empire making his
signature “Trump” name a landmark on many high profile trophy properties in
New York City, Atlantic City, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. He
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often boasted about how rich he was as proof of his business acumen. He
variously reported his net worth to be between eight and ten billion dollars
although there were questions raised in the media about just how he had
calculated those figures and how accurate they were. There was no log cabin to
penthouse mythology in Trump’s appeal although he claimed the Populist mantle
quite successfully in the end. One might think that a billionaire real estate
developer who lived in a palatial tower bearing his name in large letters on Fifth
Avenue in New York would be an unlikely hero for working class and rural
America; however, that is exactly what happened.
Trump also developed the image and persona of being somewhat of a
character with his flamboyant orange hair permanently fixed in a painfully
obvious comb over that became the butt of endless late night comics’ jokes. His
stints as a reality television impresario, especially with his show “The Apprentice”
made him a familiar figure on American television, which is one of the most
important assets all candidates seek. When it comes to a recognizable name
brand and a well-developed image, hurdles which are very hard to clear for many
candidates, Donald Trump already had those obstacles covered when he officially
entered the race on June 16, 2015.
Trump was at the head of the class of “non-politicians” who sought the
nomination in 2016, and who often pop up and then fade quickly in presidential
and governors races. However Trump did not fade. On the contrary the longer
he ran the stronger he got. That was true in the primaries and then became true
again in the general election which ended with him being elected on November
8th as the 45th president of the United States. When he won the Republican
nomination he had beaten sixteen other candidates, most of whom were well
known and experienced political leaders with many years of public service and
several high level elected offices on their records. When he won the presidency
he beat Hillary Clinton who had been a national figure for twenty five years and a
First Lady, Senator from New York, and Secretary of State in the first Obama
administration. No more improbable set of accomplishments could have been
imagined when this election season began in 2015.
Clinton and Obama in Illinois
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One premise of this paper is that a careful comparison of the Clinton and
Obama races in Illinois will be instructive in analyzing the prospects of both major
parties in Illinois and the nation. The Democrats lost the presidential race and
with it any hope of controlling Congress in November of 2016 and ultimately will
lose the control of the Supreme Court as well. The Republicans now have the
luxury of unified control of the entire federal government and with that virtually
complete power over all three branches of American government for the
foreseeable future. The Democratic Party’s future is now much debated and
speculated about as they try to accommodate to the new power equation in
Washington and to their status as the loyal opposition.
It is always difficult for a party to attain a third consecutive term and it has
only happened four times since the turn of the 20th Century, i.e. in 1908, 1928,
1940, and 1988 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 239-241). The barrier against third
terms for the same party is so great it constitutes one of the most important
variables in the various formulas that political scientists use in constructing
statistical models of who will win the presidency and what the most important
causal factors are (Abromowitz, 2016). In many respects as Obama acknowledged
while campaigning for Clinton in September of 2016, a first Clinton term would
help validate Obama’s two terms and constitute something of a referendum on
his record. As he and First Lady Michelle Obama campaigned enthusiastically for
Clinton, it was evident that they considered a victory for her to be an important
part of his legacy. At minimum a Clinton victory would provide much more
continuity than the dramatic changes which would inevitably come with a Trump
presidency.
This study is an extension of two earlier papers I published in The Simon
Review series on the Obama victories in Illinois in 2008 and 2012 (Jackson, 2009;
2013). It is also an extension of another longer term research program I have
pursued since 1972 covering all the presidential primaries, conventions and
general elections since the beginning of the reform era in presidential politics
(Jackson, 2015). These papers and that book, which are filled with longitudinal
data, attempt to document what has happened in Illinois, one of the most typical
states, a microcosm of the nation and a bellwether of the national political trends
in an era marked by growing partisan and ideological polarization and the
resulting gridlock in our state and national politics.
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Hillary Clinton’s rise to political fame and power is in many ways very
conventional and illustrates the typical path to the White House which has been
taken in the past by the many other ambitious politicians who have become
major party nominees. She is the kind of experienced and seasoned political
leader who frequently seeks the keys to the White House from a power base in
the upper reaches of power in national politics.
Of course, she is also quite different in that she is the first woman and the
first former First Lady to seek and win a major party nomination in the two
hundred and twenty seven years of American presidential history. From that
distinction she will always have a firm place in American history as an
accomplished Illinois native. In that sense she also resembles Obama who was a
pioneer in similar respects as the nation’s first African American president.
Clinton’s and Obama’s political odyssey are something of the mirror images of
each other. Obama was born in Hawaii and then settled in Illinois after graduation
from Columbia University. He built his political career with grassroots community
organizing on the south side of Chicago and then service in the Illinois State
Senate for eight years (Jackson, 2009).
Clinton’s political path is more like that of fellow Illinois native, Ronald
Reagan, who was born in Illinois but left the state as a young man to travel, first
to Iowa and then to California where he built his political career as a two term
governor before winning the presidency in 1980 and 1984. Both Abraham Lincoln
and Ulysses S. Grant were elected from Illinois but were born in Kentucky and
Ohio respectively. Adlai Stevenson was Governor of Illinois for two terms when he
won the Democratic nomination and ran against Dwight Eisenhower in both 1952
and 1956, but he lost both of those elections and even failed to carry Illinois both
times. So, Clinton’s electoral record is most like Stevenson’s although she did
manage to carry her native state handily, as did Obama before her (Stanley and
Niemi, 2013, 239-241).
In building their political base and attaining the party’s nomination and
then the presidency, however, Clinton and Obama’s victories in Illinois were very
similar in ways which illuminate the continuity in Illinois and national politics.
Their political support base, and the opposition which they encountered and
engendered, are similar and are very indicative of the deeply polarized politics in
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both the state and nation which has been the hallmarks of modern American
politics, especially since the turn of the Twenty-First Century.
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have been at the vanguard of the major
demographic and political changes taking place in American politics during the
first two decades of the 21st Century, and their candidacies are marked by
significant continuity from 2008 to 2016. We will look at the continuity and the
change in the voting data from Illinois over those three presidential elections
which have seen Illinois presidential candidates running in the eye of the political
maelstrom during this turbulent and fascinating era in our nation’s politics.
The Data Analysis
The Aggregate Data Analysis
The first thing that seems most notable about the 2016 results in Illinois is
how handily Clinton won the statewide vote and electoral vote. If Illinois had
been the clear national bellwether we usually are, she would be managing her
transition team and organizing her government now. In addition, the Democrats
would probably have control of the Senate although the Republicans would have
undoubtedly continued to control the House.
Instead, Trump and the Republicans won the Electoral College vote by a
seventy-seven vote margin although Clinton won the popular vote. In that
respect Illinois followed the national trends, although the Clinton margin in Illinois
was significantly larger than it was nationwide. Clinton won 55.8% of the popular
vote compared to Trump’s 38.8% in Illinois (Illinois State Board of Elections,
2016). However she only won a plurality of roughly 2.8 million popular votes, or
48.2 % to 46.6% of the national total (Calfas, December 20, 2016).
The Democrats picked up one of only two Senate seats they netted
nationally when Tammy Duckworth unseated incumbent Republican Mark Kirk by
a healthy margin of 55% to 40% (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016). In
addition, the Democrats also added one U.S. House seat when Brad Schneider
beat Republican incumbent Robert Dold in the tenth district, a northern suburban
seat including parts of Cook and Lake Counties. In spite of the national victory for
Trump, the Illinois Republicans did not take away any incumbent Democratic U. S.
House seats. This is partially because all the remaining seats in Illinois were pretty
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reliably in a red or blue district since the state is so polarized geographically as is
the nation based on the partisan gerrymandering which occurred after the 2010
Census. Unlike the gerrymandering in the nation as a whole which strongly
favored the Republicans, the new Illinois map drawn after the 2010 census
favored the Democrats.
The trend toward statewide victories for the Democrats in Illinois continued
with Susana Mendoza taking the Comptroller’s office away from Republican Leslie
Munger by a 49.4% to 44.4% margin (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016).
Thus, at the presidential level, U.S. Senate level, the Comptroller level, and to a
lesser extent the U. S. House level the Democrats did well in Illinois on November
8th.
The night was not a total loss for Illinois Republicans, however, since they
gained a net of four Illinois House seats and a net of two Illinois Senate seats. The
proxy war between Governor Bruce Rauner and his nemesis, Speaker of the
House Michael J. Madigan was close to a toss-up with a small margin going to the
Governor. Both sides spent unprecedented amounts of money, but the Governor
and the Republicans almost doubled the total spent by the Democrats. While
Speaker Madigan, lost his nominal super majority, he still controlled 67 seats and
Senate President John Cullerton controlled 37 seats in the Illinois Senate. While
the nation was going for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton by a majority of the
Electoral College votes Republicans in Illinois had much to celebrate about their
national victory, however the overall results in Illinois must have been something
of a disappointment to them after all the money which had been spent on their
behalf left the General Assembly in firm control of the Democrats. With the 2018
statewide elections now looming, however, the Republican Party showed real
strength in 2016 which they could build on in 2018 especially with Governor
Rauner at the head of their ticket and with the amounts of campaign money he
has access to.
Next we are going to view the map of Illinois from a more micro
perspective. That is, we move from the statewide view to the county as the level
of analysis. Illinois has 102 counties and it stretches from the Wisconsin border
on the north to Kentucky and Missouri on the south and from Iowa to Indiana on
the west and east. It is made up of small towns, small to medium sized cities and
11

vast rural areas, which constitute northern, central, western, and southern
Illinois.
Illinois also encompasses the crowded city of Chicago and the growing
suburbs of Cook and the five Collar Counties in the northeast. Cook County alone
contains a total of 41% of the population of the state with 21% being inside of the
city and 20% being outside in suburban Cook. The five Collar Counties of Lake,
McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will make up 24% of the total. They are also where
the most growth is occurring in Illinois. The five collar counties plus suburban
Cook and the City of Chicago are collectively called “Chicagoland,” and together
they constitute 65% of the state’s total population. The remaining 96 counties of
“Downstate” account for 35% of the Illinois population. Consequently, if a
candidate can win the City of Chicago, and a sizeable block of the suburbs, he or
she can pretty well count on a statewide victory even without much help from the
other ninety-six of the Downstate Counties.
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The fact that Clinton won Cook and the suburbs (except for the exurban
county of McHenry) so strongly, and added to this total another seven mostly
large counties allowed her to score the comfortable victory she enjoyed in her
native state. Clinton won the counties which contain nine out of the top ten cities
in population size. The only exception to her large county victories was
Sangamon County and Springfield, the state capital. Of the seven other counties
Clinton won, three, DeKalb, Champaign and Jackson, contain major state
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universities. The others are home to small to medium sized cities and urban areas
(Winnebago on the Wisconsin border in the far north with Rockford as its center,
Rock Island and the Quad Cities, Peoria, the home of Caterpillar and Bradley
University and St. Clair in the urban Metro-East area with Belleville as its biggest
city).
However, the fact that Trump won 90 total counties, covering a very large
percentage of the total geography of the state, is indicative of his much larger
victory tallied in the whole United States with sizable majorities in the Outstate
regions (See Appendix A; also, Barone, December 15, 2016). As one can see from
Appendix B, the total map of Illinois looks like a sea of red with a large blue land
mass quite evident in northeastern Illinois and a few islands of blue widely
interspersed throughout the rest of the state. It was Trump and his supporters
who woke up excited and savoring victory on November 9th and Clinton and her
supporters who woke up with a hangover, demoralized and depressed and
wondering what just happened.
This paper provides a part of the answer even though it is based on Illinois a
blue state where Clinton won handily. The places she won, and the other places
and groups that provided the Trump victory are evident in the data from Illinois.
They are just magnified throughout the entire map of the nation and Illinois
remains a microcosm of the nation as a whole and the trends which are marking
our very polarized nation. The 2016 presidential election results in Illinois are a
template for the very similar national results and the patterns of support for the
two candidates are indicative of where the two major parties stand currently and
how they have evolved in the early parts of the 21st Century (Appendix A and B).
As the data provided here indicate, at the aggregate level there is a deep
geographical polarization reinforced by ideological, partisan, cultural, racial,
religious, class, and ethnic divisions which are pervasive at the individual voter
level and which are unlikely to be erased by one presidential election or the first
Trump administration. Indeed, the tenor, content and conduct of this past
election are likely to have exacerbated the deep polarization of this country and
are likely to be projected into the foreseeable future. The Republicans have
gained a working majority in the House and Senate, control of the White House,
and the ability to dominate the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary for the
14

next generation. Whether they can use their newly minted unified government to
unify the country remains to be seen.
The Individual Level Data Analysis
In the section above we examined the aggregate voting returns for the
United States and for Illinois. There are many things that aggregate data can revel
and many advantage to such an analysis. Geography is of basic importance in
understanding American politics and aggregate data reveal our geographic
divisions in graphic detail. It is particularly important in analyzing presidential
election returns because of the unique institution of the Electoral College and the
pivotal position it holds in determining who wins the presidency.
The geographic subdivisions, states and counties, also reveal the
remarkable continuity in American politics which show that there is great
continuity between elections and the changes are usually marginal and
incremental (Key, 1949; Key, 1966; Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008; Levendusky,
2009). But aggregate data also have their limitations. The analyst cannot use
aggregate data effectively to focus on the individual level characteristics of the
respondents which can only be indirectly inferred from such data. It takes survey
data to provide a more precise micro level look at questions of what kinds of
people turned out to vote for which candidates (Kramer, 1983).
Fortunately, we do have survey data which are relevant to answering such
questions for Illinois voters. Since 2008 the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute has
been conducting statewide polls on government, politics and public policy
questions in Illinois. Most of the surveys have relied on a sample of 1,000
registered voters. The institute has completed ten such statewide polls and
published their results (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016). Taken together these
polls provide a rich resource of longitudinal data on this important Midwestern
state.
The survey we will rely on here is the one taken statewide from Tuesday,
September 27 through Sunday, October 2, 2016. The overall poll included 1,000
registered voters and had a margin of error of 3.1 percentage points.
The timing of the poll was based on our need to start after the first
presidential debate which was held on September 26th. This was a debate which
15

drew an unprecedented audience with an estimate that over eighty million
viewers watched it on television or on a mobile device. It was widely considered
to be a victory for Hillary Clinton according to most pundits and the scientific polls
taken after the debate ended (Saad, October 20-12, 2016). Our survey entered
the field the evening after the first debate and took most of that week to
complete. It probably caught the upswing toward Clinton which started at that
point in the campaign when she began to open up a significant lead in the polls, a
lead which only increased and grew after the second and third debates both of
which the scientific polls also estimated that she had won.
In some respects it would have been better to have a poll taken closer to
the November 8th election since it is well recognized that people can change their
minds and some are undecided up until the day they vote. However, in the case
of the 2016 presidential election, this is not an insurmountable obstacle to using
poll data taken a month before the final vote. For one thing early voting has
made it possible for millions to cast their ballot well before the official day of the
election. Early voting in Illinois started on September 29th, the week in which our
poll was in the field.
In addition this is such a polarized era that the vast majority of Americans
made a relatively early decision and knew who they would vote for, based on
party identification, ideology and reaction to the candidates’ images. In our poll
we found less than ten percent who said they were undecided about their choice
for president. So, overall there no disqualifying arguments against using data
taken from a poll done in late September and early October for the analytical
purposes pursued in this paper.
Our question regarding voting intention is the simple one used by all
pollsters, i.e. “If the election for president were being held today, would you vote
for [Trump, Clinton, Johnson, or Stein, with the order of the candidates rotated
randomly]. The results are provided in Table 3.
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Table 3
Presidential Vote Intentions
Trump

27.9%

Clinton

52.7

Johnson

5.2

Stein

1.5

Someone else

3.1

Don’t Know

9.7

N=950 Note: This question was not asked of those who said they would probably
not vote. Undecided Leaners were included in the totals for each candidate.
These results presaged a fairly handy victory for Hillary Clinton in her native
state. 52.7% chose Clinton in our poll; 27.9% chose Trump, while Johnson at 5.2%
and Stein at 1.5% divided the third party vote with 9.5% remaining undecided at
this point. It is interesting to note that this order is the same as the final
statewide aggregate vote count although the totals for each candidate increased
because of late deciders. As was indicated earlier, the final results showed that
Clinton took 55.8%; Trump 38.8% with Johnson at 3.8 % and Stein at 1.4% (Illinois
State Board of Elections). Obviously, Trump did better than our poll projected by
a margin of 10%, and this is undoubtedly because the undecideds voted
disproportionately for Trump and most of the Republican identifiers who had
been wavering, ultimately went home and voted for Trump. However, at 38.8% in
the final tally of the vote Trump only marginally exceeded what might be
considered the core base of the Republican coalition in Illinois. Clinton by contrast
achieved 55.8% in the final vote which is only 3% higher than our poll found
supporting her at approximately one month out. Our Illinois poll provides some
evidence for the proposition that Clinton did not gain the support of a lot of late
deciding voters in the last four weeks of the campaign and the late deciders
disproportionately went to Trump.
We turn next to an analysis of the three great geographical divisions of
Illinois politics, that is, the differences between the City of Chicago, the suburbs
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which are composed of Cook County outside the city plus the so called “Collar
Counties” of DuPage, Lake, Kane, Will, and McHenry counties. The remaining
ninety six counties are lumped together as “Downstate” (Colby and Green, 1986).
Table 4 provides these results.
Table 4
Presidential Vote Intentions by Geographical Division
Chicago City

Suburbs

Downstate

Trump

19%

25%

39%

Clinton

66

56

38

Johnson

6

5

4

Stein

2

1

2

Other/Don’t Know

7

13

16

The overall macro geographical analysis of any Illinois election now rests on
the well documented generalizations that Central City Chicago is a historic
stronghold for the Democratic Party; much of Downstate is a stronghold for the
Republican Party, and the balance of power, as well as most population growth in
Illinois lies in the suburbs (Ibid). These widely shared expectations about how
Illinois votes are borne out and reinforced by the results in Table 4. Nationally it
is widely recognized that there are “blue states” and “red states”, i.e. those which
historically vote for the Democrats and the Republicans respectively and which
can ordinarily be favored to win those states routinely (Bishop, 2008, Gelman,
2008). Illinois has been regarded as a dependably blue state since 1992 when Bill
Clinton bested George H. W. Bush in the Prairie State that year. The last time the
Republicans won Illinois in a presidential election was when Bush beat Dukakis in
1988.
Inside the states there are also blue counties and regions and red counties
and regions which are just as dependable for their parties no matter what the
state-wide results are or what the context of the particular campaign is. Some
Illinois counties have been voting reliably Republican, or before that Whig, since
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Abraham Lincoln was running for office. In Illinois the City of Chicago is deep
blue, most of the Downstate counties are red, and the suburbs are purple since
they are more diverse and less dependable for either party.
Clearly Clinton ran away with the responses in Chicago with two-thirds of
the respondents to our poll saying they planned to vote for her. Downstate was
very close, but there the usual expectations held with Trump enjoying a slight
lead of 39% to 38% in our poll. The swing counties of the suburbs, however, show
where elections are won in Illinois. There Clinton was projected to do very well
sporting a 56.5% to 25.5% lead over Trump at that point in the fall campaign.
Comparisons with the final vote tally provided by the Illinois State Board of
Elections show that our projections were not far wide of the final mark. There is a
widely shared expectation in Illinois politics that a Republican will get beaten in
the City of Chicago, and the Democratic candidate will get beaten Downstate.
The relevant questions are ordinarily about turnout and about how much each
party will win or lose in those two predictable areas. The payoff answer,
however, is in suburban Chicago. There we see from these results that Donald
Trump at the time of our poll was doing very poorly for a Republican candidate.
He lost those Collar Counties and suburban Cook County by a wide margin in our
poll and as it turned out he lost Cook and four of the five Collar Counties in the
final vote.
It is also true that this level of loss in urban and suburban America is the
key to the size and the contours of Trump’s deficits (and strengths) nation-wide
which resulted in Clinton winning the popular vote by almost three million votes.
It is important to note also that Clinton’s loss in the rural, small town and small
city areas, both in Illinois and nationally, was decisive and this led to her loss of
the Electoral College and the presidency.
We are a nation deeply divided by where we live and the economic
situation, personal identification and life style implications of those residence
choices. Geography may not necessarily be absolute destiny in American politics,
but it is a very important part of the explanation for how the American voter sees
the world and behaves politically and why our political results are so divided at
the aggregate level (Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008).
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Moving past geography as an explanation for voting behavior, there are
some other well-known and widely recognized explanatory variables that have
been used consistently for almost seventy years in explaining why Americans vote
as they do (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, et al., 1966). These
are the variables that uniquely depend on survey data to analyze at the individual
level.
The most important of these are party identification and ideology. These
are the two most important psychological or attitudinal variables identified in the
long line of historic studies that have accumulated over seven decades in the
extensive voting behavior literature which is the best mined empirical subfield in
all of Political Science (Ibid). Those two variables for Illinois voters are covered in
Tables 5 and 6 below.
Table 5
Presidential Vote Intentions by Party Identification
Democrat

Independent

Republican

Trump

3%

34%

69%

Clinton

86

36

9

Johnson

3

8

6

Stein

1

3

2

Other/D/K

8

19

14

Table 6
Presidential Vote Intentions by Political Ideology
Liberal

Moderate

Conservative

Trump

5%

17%

61%

Clinton

85

55

17

Johnson

3

9

4
20

Stein

2

1

1

Other/D/K

5

17

16

It is evident from these two tables that the traditional voting behavior
explanations were very important in the Trump versus Clinton contest no matter
how unorthodox and unconventional their campaigns were. As expected party
identification and ideology are quite systematically related to the voting
intentions of the Illinois respondents in this poll. As Table 5 shows, fully 86% of
the Democratic respondents reported that they intended to vote for Clinton,
while 36% of the Independents and 9% of the Republicans said they would vote
for Clinton.
This is in comparison with 69% of the Republicans who said they planned to
vote for Trump, with 34% of the Independents and 3% of the Democrats who
reported the same plans. 36% of the Independents in our poll said they planned
to vote for Clinton. These results clearly indicate some of the distance Trump
made up nationally in the last four weeks as the exit polls show that Trump
ultimately took 90% of the Republican vote and 48% of the Independent vote
while Clinton took 89% of the Democratic vote nationally and 42% of the
Independents (AEI and Pew Exit polls, November 9, 2016).
The other most important attitudinal variable is self-identified ideology.
We have long recognized that the nation is deeply divided on ideological grounds.
When this polarization first became evident, the conservatives had an almost two
to one advantage with approximately 40% saying they were conservatives, 20%
liberals, and the remainder in between as moderates. More recently, the percent
identifying as liberal has grown marginally and the conservatives have shrunk a bit
(Newport, 2016). That pattern has been even more true in Illinois where over the
long term, liberals have increased from 27% in 2010 to 33% in 2016 while
conservatives have dropped from 40% to 33% with the moderates only moving
from 27% to 28% during the same period (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, June,
2016, 40-41).
Self-identified ideology provided an advantage to Clinton in our data from
Illinois voters. From Table 6 we can see that 85% of liberals said they would vote
for Clinton with 55% of the moderates and 17% of the conservatives saying they
would also vote for her. On the Trump side, only 61% of conservatives said they
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would vote for him while 17% said they would vote for Clinton. Moderates broke
in Clinton’s favor by 55% to 17%. This result from Illinois indicates something
about the problems Trump encountered early and up until the later stages of his
campaign when Republican identifiers and conservatives essentially went home
and voted for Trump nationally by 81% to 15% for Clinton (AEI and Pew Exit polls,
November 10, 2016).
The next set of important explanations for the vote are the fundamental
demographic variables which we have covered in Tables 7- 12 below. The results
fit some recognized patterns from the voting behavior research generally with
some interesting twists and variations associated with this particular campaign.
Table 7
Presidential Vote Intention by Gender
Male

Female

Trump

34%

22%

Clinton

46

59

Johnson

7

4

Stein

1

2

Other/D/K

12

14

We will examine gender first. Since 1980 and the Reagan vs. Carter race,
gender has played an important part in explaining large groups of people who
vote differently. Before 1980 women voters gave a modest edge to Republican
presidential candidates compared to men. The 1980 election produced the first
instance of the “gender gap” which saw men voting disproportionately for the
Republican candidate and women voting disproportionately for the Democratic
candidate (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, Chapter 5; Conway, Steuernagel and
Ahern, 2005, Chapter 5). In that race women voted for the Democrats by a 12%
margin while men voted for the Republicans by a 4% margin (Jennings and Niemi,
2000, 119). Since 1980 the gender gap has ranged up and down from four to
twelve percent, but it has constantly appeared.
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The candidates of the 2016 campaign produced a firm expectation that the
gender gap would continue and probably grow. Hillary Clinton was the first
woman to ever run at the top of the ticket for a major party. That alone would
have provoked ample expectations for a gender gap. Then Trump made a
number of comments deemed to be disrespectful and dismissive of women. Early
in the campaign, he publicly attacked a number of high profile women, like Carly
Fiorina and Megyn Kelly. Later he was overheard making misogynistic comments
in a tape recording taken from an “Access Hollywood” bus trip which was leaked
to the press. That revelation then stimulated accusations from a dozen women
who came forward and accused Trump of unprovoked and unwanted sexual
attacks on them. This controversy continued up until election day and beyond.
Table 7 provides the results in the first column for the gender differences
among Illinois voters. As expected, the gender gap was very much in evidence in
our poll. Trump was supported by 34% of the male voters and only 22% of female
voters. This constitutes a 12% difference for male vs. female Trump voters.
Clinton was supported by 46% of male voters and 59% of female voters, for a 13%
difference.
Thus, our expectations of a sizeable gender gap were borne out.
Nationally, the final exit polls indicated that there was a gender gap of 12% across
the entire voting population (Pew and AEI exit polls). This is almost identical to
the gender gap we found in Illinois one month before the election. Thus, for the
long term the Republicans have a problem appealing to women voters and
Democrats, likewise, have a problem appealing to male voters. That is true both
nationally and in Illinois and the gap continued in 2016.
This will undoubtedly be an issue that the Democratic National Committee
and Democratic leaders in general will debate and puzzle over as they try to
construct a narrative about the future of their party in the wake of their stinging
and unexpected loss of the presidential election. Since the Republicans won so
handily and now control all three branches of the government they are not likely
to worry a great deal in the immediate future about appealing more to women
voters.
Next, age is ordinarily an important independent variable offering some
explanation for the vote. From the early days of the voting behavior research the
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expectation has been that young people are more likely to vote for the Democrats
and the older people are more likely to vote for the Republicans. This
generalization goes back to the roots of the whole voting behavior research
enterprise (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller,
and Stokes, 1966). Later research showed that this relationship depended on the
generational experiences of the age cohorts. For example, if the oldest cohort
came of age during the Great Depression, they were more likely to be Democrats
and to retain that identification over time (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, 92-95).
Table 8
Presidential Vote Intentions by Age
<35

35-50

51-65

Trump

15%

22%

30%

37%

Clinton

57

58

49

53

Johnson

13

6

4

2

4

2

1

0

Other/D/K 11

12

16

8

Stein

66+

Our poll results in Table 8 indicate that age did not really discriminate much
for Clinton’s planned voters in Illinois. Fifty-seven percent of the under 35 voters
said they planned to vote for Clinton; 58% of the middle aged voters indicated
Clinton; 49% of the fifty-one to sixty-five age group and 53% of the senior citizens
said they would vote for Clinton. This indicates a small four percent advantage for
Clinton among the youngest cohort of voters when compared to the oldest
Clinton voters.
This compares to only 15% of the youngest category under 35 who planned
to vote for Trump; 22% of the 35 to 50 group; 30% of the 51 to 65 group; and 37%
of those 65 and above who said they planned to vote for Trump. So, it is evident
that the relationship between age and intention to vote for Trump is a linear one
and that the older the respondent was the more likely they were to plan to vote
for Trump in this poll. But, the paltry 15% of the youngest voter category, those
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35 and younger, indicated just how much of a problem the youngest age cohort
was for the Trump campaign early on.
Certainly this was true in Illinois and it also appears to be true from all the
exit polls for the nation as a whole. Those exit polls showed that the youngest
cohort, 18 to 29 year olds voted 55% to 37% for Clinton over Trump while the
oldest cohort, 65 and up voted for Trump by 53% to 45% (Pew and AEI exit polls).
The problem for the Clinton camp, however, was turnout among the young. They
were counting on a heavy turnout from the youngest age cohort, and while
Clinton did very well among young voters, their turnout did not quite live up to
the early expectations and that loss may have been just enough for the margin of
victory to go to Trump instead of Clinton (Pew poll, November 10, 2016).
The other highly important demographic variable for explaining the vote
generically is race. It has long been recognized that white voters are much more
likely to choose a Republican ballot while minority voters, especially AfricanAmerican and Hispanic voters are more likely to vote for the Democrats. This
racial divide is long standing and has become one of the most important fault
lines in American politics. It is mostly the result of the almost complete
re-alignment of the white south out of the Democratic Party and into the
Republican Party while the black South went the opposite direction in the wake of
the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s (Key, 1949; Black and Black, 1987, 1992).
Today the white South is the most important and most dependable component of
the Republican Party coalition and one which gives it a major advantage in
congressional elections and a solid base for the presidential elections.
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Table 9
Presidential Vote Intentions by Race
White

Black

Hispanic

Trump

35%

2%

12%

20%

Clinton

45

82

78

62

Johnson

6

3

0

7

Stein

1

1

2

0

13

12

7

11

Other/D/K

Other

Table 9 indicates that this fault line certainly continued to hold true in
Illinois when it comes to the minority voters but the picture with white voters is
more complicated. Eighty-two percent of Illinois black voters indicated that they
intended to vote for Clinton while 78% of Hispanic voters indicated the same. The
final exit polls showed that these racial disparities only grew in the final vote. The
national exit polls indicate that Clinton received 88% of the African-American vote
compared to 8% for Trump and 65% of the Hispanic vote for Clinton to 29% for
Trump (AEI and Pew Polls). Clinton’s final tally compares somewhat unfavorably
with the 92% of black voters, and 71% of Hispanics who voted for Obama in 2012.
(Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). Thus, Clinton won handily among both of the
nation’s largest minority groups, but their preference for her fell somewhat below
the levels achieved by Obama in both 2008 and 2012 and indicates how she could
come close but still lose the presidency.
More importantly electorally are the 70% of the voters who are white. Our
Illinois poll showed 45% of white voters planned to vote for Clinton while only
35% said they would vote for Trump. The final results indicate that white voters
nationwide ultimately decided to vote disproportionately for Trump over Clinton.
Although like our Illinois respondents white voters nation-wide may have
harbored initial reluctance to vote for Trump, but in the final analysis they were
the keys to his national victory.
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The final national exit polls showed that Clinton encountered major
problems with white voters which proved to be impossible to overcome. Trump
won the white vote by a 21% margin, 58% to 37%. This is in contrast to the 59%
of white voters who went for Romney in 2012 and 55% who went for McCain in
2008 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). Trump won among white voters without
college degrees by 67% to 28%. This was the largest gap since the exit polls were
initiated in 1980 (Tyson, 2016, Pew exit polls). Trump won white voters with a
college degree by 49% to 45%. Since there are more white voters without college
degrees than any other demographic group in the nation, Trump’s strength with
this group was the most essential fact in the electoral win for him.
The “Autopsy” of the 2012 campaign done by the Republican National
Committee studied how to increase their appeal to the young, minorities and
women among other demographic groups (Republican National Committee,
March 18, 2013). Many critics pointed out that the Republican base was heavily
weighted toward white people and the oldest voters and no party can stake their
future on the cohort which is declining most rapidly. This problem will
undoubtedly cease to be very compelling for Republicans as they contemplate
their future as the masters of a whole new universe ushered in by their victories
in congress and the presidency on November 8th.
It will, however, become a bone of contention for the Democrats as they
begin the inevitable task of trying to understand what went wrong with their
presidential and congressional hopes and expectations. There will undoubtedly
be recriminations and debates regarding what to do about the Democrats’ losses
and how to broaden the appeal of the party at the national, state and local levels.
The debate started within one week of the election results being counted when
some on the left who had supported Bernie Sanders voiced the opinion that
Sanders would have won the presidency, a view Sanders himself seemed to
consider likely (Stiglitz, November 18, 2016). They were opposed by other party
elements who contended that the Democrats had moved too far to the left and
that their long term salvation depended on a tack back toward the middle. Those
familiar factions within the Democratic Party had been muted during eight years
of the Obama Administration; however, they broke out in full force when Clinton
lost the presidency and the Democrats failed to take back the Senate. That
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debate is only beginning as this paper is being written, but it will not go away any
time soon. It is the inevitable and unenviable fate of the losing party.
Another variable where there was expected to be a wide disparity between
Clinton supporters and Trump supporters was religious identification. For several
cycles now those who identify with the more fundamentalist churches and those
who attend church services the most regularly have been avidly supporting the
Republican Party (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). This is a trend that is especially
important in the South; however, it is an important national trend as well. On the
other side of the coin, those who identify with more mainline Protestant
denominations, Jewish people, and those who are secular and claim no religious
affiliation have increasingly voted for Democratic presidential candidates.
Accordingly, scholars have discovered a “religious gap” which has taken on more
and more importance in a deeply polarized America.
Table 10 reports on our question asking the voters whether they consider
themselves to be an evangelical or born again Christian. Table 11 provides the
results on the question of how often they attend church services.
Table 10
Vote Intentions by Evangelical Christian Identification
Born Again? Yes

No

Trump

42%

31%

Clinton

38

48

72

Johnson

3

6

4

Stein

1

1

2

17

13

2

Other/D/K

Non Christian
12%

It is evident from this table that there was indeed a religion gap in the 2016
Illinois presidential election. 42% of the evangelical or born again Christians said
they would vote for Trump while only 31% of those who did not claim this
religious identification said they would vote for Trump. On the other side, 38% of
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the evangelical or born again Christians said they would vote for Clinton while
48% of those who did not claim this identification were Clinton voters.
The final results for the nation as a whole showed just how dramatically the
evangelical church people finally settled on Trump over Clinton. The exit polls
showed that evangelical church goers made up 26%, or slightly over one quarter
of the total voting population. They voted for Trump over Clinton by a resounding
83% to 16% (Tyson, 2016; Bowman, 2016, Pew and AEI polls). Whatever early
trepidation evangelicals may have felt about Trump’s private life and public
conduct, they swallowed those misgivings and trooped to the polls for Trump at
rates higher than they had supported Mitt Romney over Obama in 2012.
Another closely related category is those who attend church most
frequently. Studies have consistently shown that those who attend church
weekly or even more often are much more likely to vote for the Republicans. Our
results in Table 11 show that this was not the case for the presidential vote in
Illinois in 2016 projected at the time our poll was taken. The division between the
most devout, those who attend weekly was close but shades in Clinton’s favor by
4%. Those who said they attended almost every week or once or twice a month
and a few times a year were for Clinton by an even more lopsided margins.
Among the most secular, i.e. the never attend, there was a 39% gap, which was in
keeping with the final national results according to the exit polls.
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Table 11
Vote Intentions by Frequency of Church Attendance
Every
Week

Almost
Every
week

Once or
twice a
month

A few
times a
year

Never

Refused

Trump 40%

20%

27%

26%

20%

30%

Clinton 44

54

55

55

59

45

Johnson 3

9

3

5

7

5

Stein

1

1

1

1

2

5

Other/
D/K

12

16

14

13

11

15

A global economy and multi-national trade deals have pluses and minuses
in terms of how many jobs they create and destroy and it is now widely
understood that they create winners and losers. Those who lost their jobs
because of trade imbalances or jobs moving off shore were also those most often
identified as the angry and disaffected people most attracted to Trump.
There is growing understanding that those without much education and
without the skills that are important to gaining and holding a job in the modern
economy, where the competitive worker may be half a world away, fall
disproportionately on the less educated. These voters are often also
disproportionately congregated geographically in the old American “Rust Belt” of
the upper Midwest and in the rural parts of the South and the Great Plains states.
Thus, there is also a geographic overlay to the educational base dynamic.
Our data taken from Illinois, a state which has also experienced significant
economic hardship among some industries and in some geographic areas,
especially the rural and small cities of Illinois, indicate some support for this
hypothesis about the uneven impact of trade and the global economy on the
voters.
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Table 12
Presidential Vote Intentions by Education
H. S. or Less

Some College

College +

Trump

29%

30%

26%

Clinton

54

50

55

Johnson

4

5

5

Stein

1

1

2

Other/D/K

11

14

12

Table 12 shows that those with high school or less education and some
college were somewhat more likely to be Trump supporters (29% and 30%
respectively) while only 26% of those with college degrees said they would
support Trump in our Illinois poll.
The Clinton side is murkier in our poll since 54% of those with only a high
school education and 55% of those with a college degree said they planned to
vote for Clinton. The “some college” category was actually the lowest with 50% of
them who claimed plans to support Clinton. They, too, are probably among the
voters who have disproportionately suffered from the economic disruptions of a
global market and reduced job supplies, but the differences between this group
and the lowest and highest educational group are not large in our study. This is
the place where our Illinois poll, taken about one month before the election,
varied the most markedly from the final results as reflected in the exit polls. This
may be partially attributable to there being more undecided voters among those
with less education and those who decided late went disproportionately for
Trump. It is also possible, also, of course, that Illinois was simply not a bellwether
of the final national results when it comes to the impact of education and Illinois
did go for Clinton more heavily than the national popular vote did although the
difference was not large.
The exit polls showed that those voters without a college degree voted for
Trump by a 52% to 44% margin. College graduates voted for Clinton by a 52% to
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43% margin (Tyson, Pew exit poll, 2016). However, if the analysis is restricted to
just white voters the picture changes. There the exit polls found that 67% of
whites without college degrees supported Trump compared to 28% for Clinton- a
39 point advantage to Trump. This is the largest this educational gap has been
going back to 1980 (Ibid).
White college graduates voted for Trump over Clinton by a 49% to 45%
margin. The white respondents had to have an advanced graduate or
professional degree before you find more than a majority for Clinton over Trump.
This constituted a massive educational gap which favored Trump when you
consider how many voters have not graduated college (72%) versus those who
have attained at least a bachelor’s degree or a graduate or professional degree
(28%) (Galston and Hedrickson, November 18, 2016). This is a problem of some
serious magnitude for the Democrats who used to win the less educated vote by a
wide margin. At least for this election, the less educated were the Trump base,
and they are much more numerous than those with advanced education. Perhaps
this is why he famously exclaimed in one of his rallies near the end, “I love the less
educated.”
Looking Toward the Future: What Does It All Mean?
Donald Trump’s victory in winning the presidency was as unexpected as his
campaign was unconventional. The last polls before the election had consistently
shown that it would be a close race, but almost all of the national polls showed
Clinton with a small lead, well within the margin of error for most. Indeed, at the
point when the late polls were taken, the Real Clear Politics averages had shown
Clinton with a modest lead that she had maintained for approximately ninety days
of the general election contest.
While searching for answers analysts and pundits turned toward the
explanation that the late deciders had apparently gone disproportionately for
Trump. In addition, Republican Party identifiers almost all went back to their
partisan home finally since the exit polls showed that 90% of them voted for the
party’s nominee. Independents split, but voted somewhat more heavily for
Trump than had been expected.
Turnout is always important and turnout was down to 55.6 % which is not
bad but falls significantly below the 61.6 attained in Obama’s first election in 2008
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and somewhat below the 58.2 % achieved in Obama’s second election in 2012
(Stanley and Niemi, 2015, 5). Just as importantly, the Democratic constituencies
that Clinton relied on so heavily, especially African-American and Hispanic voters
and the young did vote for her markedly as expected; however, their margins did
not quite reach the levels enjoyed by Obama in 2008 or even in 2012. Also, their
turnout rates declined just a bit, but enough to make the crucial difference.
It is also worth noting that Clinton won the popular vote, as the polls had
accurately predicted by nearly three million votes or a 2 percent margin. In spite
of this achievement, she also lost the Electoral College vote by a vote of 304 to
227 (Calfas, December 20, 2016). Trump became the fifth American president
selected by the Electoral College even though he lost the popular vote by a
significant margin. The election of 2016 also became the second time in the 21st
Century to see the popular vote winner denied the presidency, with the
contentious 2000 election being the first instance. This constitutes two out of five
(40%) presidential elections held in this century and may presage a new trend in
this deeply polarized era in American politics.
The major reason Clinton lost the Electoral College vote was that she lost
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, three states that Democrats had routinely
won and that she counted on as her “blue wall” of electoral protection against
just such a result. She lost those three by a combined total of approximately
100,000 votes. Those were all big industrial states, commonly referred to now as
the “Rust Belt” where the globalization of the economy had hurt jobs and
manufacturing, and they are all states with a major agricultural sector to their
economy. They are also states with large cities and metropolitan areas where the
major centers of economic and political power in this country are located and
where there is a serious rural versus urban political and cultural divide.
Those big traditionally Democratic states have a lot in common with Illinois
which has experienced many of the same economic stresses and where
manufacturing jobs losses have been significant as the nation and the world
turned increasingly toward the service and high tech economy and away from the
basic manufacturing sector where productivity increases, as well as international
trade, had eliminated millions of jobs.
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The biggest difference, of course, is that Clinton won her native state while
also losing the presidency. The contours of that victory, however, are very
instructive for what Clinton’s and Trump’s performances in Illinois can teach us
about the future of both major parties, and especially about the challenge which
now faces the Democratic Party. Like all parties which lose the presidential
contest, the Democrats now face a period of uncertainty, internal conflict and
soul-searching as they try to chart their future and plan and hope for a comeback. The Republicans faced the same problem in 2013 when they lost for the
second time to Obama.
The blueprint of their comeback was led by Reince Priebus, the Chair of the
Republican National Committee, now the Chief of Staff in the Trump White
House, which commissioned a thorough study of the Republicans’ electoral
problems and laid out plans for recapturing the White House and keeping the
congress (Republican National Committee, 2013). In due time the Democrats will
undoubtedly come forward with a similar document led by the new Chair of the
Democratic National Committee as they try to decide who will speak for the party
and what course they should take. The challenge for the Democrats is magnified
by the fact that they now face a Republican Party in complete control of the two
political branches and a period of unified government under the Republicans’
control will tax the ability of the Democrats to develop a come-back strategy.
For the Democrats, just understanding and analyzing carefully where they
won and lost, both in a geographic and in the individual and group identity levels
of analysis is crucial to getting started on finding a cure. In this quest it would be
useful to start with geography because this was truly a deeply divided election
geographically where the contours of the outcome were etched in the political
boundaries of the states and the counties. This was evident in the national results
which showed a deep division between the predominantly urban and the rural
states and the urban and rural areas within the states with the suburbs acting as
something of a bridge and balance of power between the two.
In addition, there were the usual deep regional differences between the
northeast and the west coast with a smattering of other western states such as
Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado going blue, and Illinois and Minnesota in
between as Democratic bastions in the Midwest. The rest of the nation was red.
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The Democrats will need to figure out why they suffered such an unexpected
defeat so soon after Barack Obama’s lopsided victory in 2008 followed by his
somewhat closer, but nevertheless comfortable majority vote victory in 2012. If
one examines the aggregate results from Obama’s almost landslide victory of
2008, to a convincing but more narrow victory in 2012, to Clinton’s loss in 2016
there is a clear downward progression which threatens to make the Democrats a
distinctly minority party for a political generation.
If one examines carefully the national electoral picture from a county level
of analysis, it is clear that the urban rural divide was starkly salient as Appendix A
shows graphically. The national electoral map looks like a sea of red broken
intermittently by areas of blue almost all of which are the locations of major cities
and metropolitan areas. The small blue exceptions in the south are where the
black vote is strong in some rural counties which is also the case in the southwest
except that the minorities there tend to be Hispanic. Thus, geographic, racial and
ethnic divisions marked our electoral results in 2016 even more decisively than in
other recent elections. With the election of Trump over Clinton those divisions
became even more evident and appeared to be even more hardened by the
maturing of the era of polarization which has marked American politics for more
than a generation now.
Appendix B for the Illinois results shows graphically just how deep the
divisions between the rural versus urban areas were, again with the suburbs
providing the balance which in Illinois tilted toward Clinton. Clinton only carried
12 counties and those counties were mostly the big counties and/or the locations
of mid-sized cities where the major state universities are located.
The trends which worked against Clinton and for Trump nationally have
been underway for a long time and have worked to the advantage of the
Republicans although in Illinois the big counties continued to provide a
Democratic margin that kept the state blue in 2016.
In an earlier and related Simon Review paper I examined the counties
carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008. Appendix C provides those results (See
Jackson, 2013). There were 23 of these counties compared to 79 for Mitt
Romney. The counties Obama carried were four of the collar counties plus
DeKalb in northeastern Illinois, a long line of northern and western Illinois
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counties plus Champaign, the only county he carried in central Illinois, St. Clair in
the Metro-east area, and Jackson and Alexander counties in southern Illinois.
Here again we find Obama’s success in Illinois in 2012 depended on the big urban
counties, the places with a major state university, and a smattering of agricultural
and small city based counties in northwestern Illinois.
Romney won all the predominantly rural and agricultural based counties.
If geography were the only consideration, the amount of red on the Appendix C
map shows just how broad Romney’s support was and how much of the state it
covered. While this result is not enough to win the presidency, or even a
statewide office, it does give some important clues as to where the Republican
Party has traditionally been the strongest in Illinois and where they routinely
dominate county level offices, state legislative seats, and congressional districts
which are so red that no Democrat has a realistic chance of winning and the
incumbent often does not draw a serious challenger.
This safe red and safe blue districts pattern in the rural versus urban areas
of Illinois is also endemic to the nation as a whole and is a key to understanding
how the Republicans have dominated the U. S. House since 2010 and why the
Democrats did so badly in the 2010, 2014, and 2016 congressional races. If the
Democrats do not improve their results in the 2018 mid-term elections, they face
a bleak future after the 2020 census leads to another reapportionment round
whose impact will last until 2030.
From a party building perspective it is important to understand where the
changes are taking place. This understanding is particularly important now for the
Democrats since it is they who will have to drill down deeply in these results for
every state and try to learn where they have failed and how they can correct their
problems for the future. Their potential for ever returning to national power
quite literally depends on understanding these trends and starting to develop a
long term strategy that must clearly take geography and demographics into
account. The need for Republicans to do the same strategic analysis is not nearly
so immediate or compelling since they won control over all the branches of the
federal government in the 2016 elections and controlled 31 of the state
governorships and controlled the state legislative bodies by 68 to 31 chambers or
a better than two to one margin.
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Appendices D and E highlight the tides of change which worked against
Clinton in the 2016 results even though she won the state handily in the popular
vote. In effect, this is also a template for her national results where she won the
popular vote by 2.8 million votes while losing the Electoral College. On the theme
of change, it is worth noting that Trump did not lose a single county in Illinois that
Romney had carried in 2012. Likewise, Clinton did not carry a county in 2016 that
Obama had lost in 2012. In Illinois, as nationally, the best predictor of how a
county will likely vote is to look at their prior voting history. In a polarized era
that correlation is very high.
From Appendices D and E we can see where Clinton’s losses, compared to
Obama’s victories in 2012 and 2008 lay, and these appendices also show that
some of the earlier losses belonged to Obama as his number of counties won was
effectively cut in half between 2008 and 2012 (from 46 to 23). Those losses
accelerated for Clinton in 2016. The counties that flipped between 2008 and 2012
and then between 2012 and 2016 all moved in a pro Republican direction. The
2016 story is a familiar one by now. Clinton’s losses were centered in northern
and northwestern and western Illinois with the addition of Alexander, a small
rural and agricultural county with a high percentage minority population in deep
southern Illinois.
The land area in northwestern Illinois included in the map of Clinton’s
losses, is represented in the U. S. House by a Democrat, Congresswoman Cheri
Bustos from the 17th District. She is based in East Moline/ Rock Island and is the
only remaining Democratic member of the U. S. House from Illinois outside the
city and its immediate suburbs. This group of outstate Democrats used to include
members from the metro-east area, members from central Illinois and deep
southern Illinois holding seats continuously going all the way back to World War
II. The Democratic Party’s Downstate delegation is now reduced to the single seat
Bustos holds in the 17th District. Again, this is an indicator for what has happened
to House Democrats throughout the country as rural and small town and small
city representative districts have been taken over by the Republicans. This also
means nationally that the former “Blue Dog Democrats” who constituted a
moderate coalition have now almost totally been replaced by Republicans, usually
very conservative Republicans. The remaining Democrats tend to be from the
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cities and to be more liberal than the moderate Blue Dogs were. This is a part of
the realignment which has so polarized American politics in this century.
Appendix E provides a further elaboration on the theme of partisan
realignment. Highlighted here are the counties in transition, in this case from
voting Democratic in 2012 (and in 2008) but switching to the Republican side in
2016. As we saw earlier from the maps provided in the appendices, this is a story
of those places where Obama won his overwhelming Illinois victory in 2008 and
his somewhat scaled down victory in 2012. These are counties where swing
voters live and counties which also may be in transition from leans Democratic to
leans Republican
Some are recent realignments, such as in southern Illinois, where formerly
deep dyed blue counties, depending on a mixture of social conservatives who
were also progressive on economic issues and union issues have changed over to
the Republican Party. These counties, not coincidentally, are the places where
manufacturing and mining jobs have dried up or been seriously reduced in
number. They are also places where the labor unions, especially the United Mine
Workers, the Laborers, and the Steel Workers have been reduced in numbers and
in political strength. When the labor unions lost numbers and power, the
Democratic Party lost crucial numbers of voters and power in the halls of
Congress and reduced control of the Illinois state legislative seats. Thus, the saga
of what happened to Clinton in 2016, and what has been happening to Downstate
Democrats in Illinois continued to unfold and accelerate in 2016.
In an attempt to understand geographic and demographic continuity and
change more thoroughly, Appendices F through I provide a listing and graphic
representation of those consistently blue and red counties. They also provide a
more in depth analysis of some of the most important demographic variables
which I hypothesized would distinguish these counties with quite polar political
histories.
Appendix F provides an overview of where the most loyal Democratic
counties are in Illinois. These are the counties that were won by the Democrats
consistently between 2000 and 2016. This period includes the candidacies of Al
Gore, John Kerry, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton spanning five presidential
elections and sixteen years. Through all the changes in the international,
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national, state and local context, and taking into consideration all of the
differences between these four candidates and their opponents, these six
counties stayed firmly in the Democratic column and provided the loyal base for
the Democrats for the first five elections of the 21st Century.
The geographic locations of these counties range from Cook County, the
mega-county in northeastern Illinois, Rock Island in western Illinois, Peoria and
Champaign in central Illinois, St. Clair in the Metro-East southwestern location
adjacent to St. Louis, and Jackson County in southern Illinois. Chicago is, of course,
the major population and economic center of the entire state and is dominant in
economic terms and which also has a lot of political power because of its size and
diversity.
Outside Chicago, the most loyal Democratic counties are all medium sized
or large counties except for Jackson which has a long history of supporting
Democrats and is the home of Southern Illinois University Carbondale.
Champaign is a medium sized county in central Illinois and the home to the
University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, the state’s flagship and largest university.
Peoria is the home of Caterpillar and Bradley University and is a bastion of some
strength for organized labor. Rock Island, on the Iowa border and a part of the
“Quad Cities” metropolitan complex, is also known for its manufacturing history
and for the strength of its labor movement. All of these counties display the kinds
of demographic and economic diversity one would expect to be the geographic
hallmarks of the Democratic base.
Appendix G graphically highlights those most loyal Republican counties in
Illinois. These are the counties where the Republican candidate for president has
won every election between 2000 and 2016. The first thing one notices is that the
list of super loyal counties is much longer for the Republicans than it is for the
Democrats. There are 56 such Republican counties and only 6 of the Democratic
strongholds. Of course, the large population of the loyal Democratic counties
helps to make up for the much more numerous loyal Republican counties.
Nevertheless, as the nation learned in both 2000 and 2016, geography and
control of more states and congressional districts does make a difference in
gaining control of political power, especially in the White House and the U.S.
House of Representative both of which reward a strategic and efficient
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geographic distribution of party strength over the popular vote. In 2016 the
American public once again learned the basic civics lesson that the Electoral
College can negate the popular vote in the selection of the U. S. president.
Keep in mind that this consistent Republican support included the two
Barack Obama presidential victories in 2008 and 2012 when he won
overwhelming popular and Electoral College victories nationally and statewide in
2008 and strong, but not as dominate victories both nationally and statewide in
2012. Central, western and most parts of southern Illinois have been bastions of
dependable Republican strength in the 21st century although this strength is of
recent vintage in southern Illinois. Some of this dominance has been in place
literally since Lincoln ran for the first time in 1860 for the newly formed
Republican Party and many of those counties have been the backbone of the
Republican Party in Illinois ever since.
Table 13 was assembled to provide a more in depth and comparative
demographic description of the most loyal Republican and the most loyal
Democratic counties over the period since the 2000 elections. A deeper
perspective is provided by delving into the demographics of these deep red and
deep blue Illinois counties. Appendices H and I provide the more in depth county
by county democratic description of these same counties.

This analysis reveals that the counties which voted for Trump were much
smaller and mostly more rural, and of course much more numerous than those
which voted for Clinton. This has been the pattern for all of the election cycles in
Illinois since the 2000 election as these appendices show that those counties
which have been the consistent base of support for the Republican Party are
much more homogeneous racially at 95.5% white compared to 2.9% black and
2.1% Hispanic. By comparison the Democratic base counties are 74.5% white,
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18.l4% black and 8.9% Hispanic. So, racial diversity versus homogeneity is the
most obvious and most notable description of the traditionally red versus
traditionally blue counties in Illinois.
As Table 13 indicates, there were some income disparities evident as well.
The most notable is that the median per capita income is almost $3,000 higher in
the blue counties compared to the red counties. On the other hand, median
household income was essentially the same in the two types of counties and the
percent below the poverty line was somewhat higher in the blue counties. This
finding illustrates the fact that the Democratic counties are very diverse and often
there is a large gap between the well off and the poor in these counties. The fact
is that both red and blue counties have the problems and challenges of significant
poverty and income inequality, and they have persistent demands for social
safety net types of governmental protections for the have nots.
Appendix J is also a complement to Table 13. It provides the demographic
characteristics of the swing or battleground counties. These are the ones which
Obama carried in 2012 (and in 2008) but which Clinton lost in 2016. These
counties could be either the harbingers of a more permanent partisan
realignment in favor of the Republican Party, or the home of more voters who are
more independent and more open to persuasion by either party. They stuck with
Obama when his national and state popularity had declined in 2012 as compared
to 2008, but they were not willing to choose Clinton over Trump in 2016.
Appropriately, these swing counties fit between the most loyal Democratic
counties and the most loyal Republican counties on the demographics. That is
they are much smaller in population than the loyal blue counties and essentially
the same population as the loyal red counties. They are more diverse racially
than the red counties, but a good deal less diverse than the blue counties. On
percent white, percent black and percent Hispanic, the swing counties are more
like the red counties than the more diverse blue counties.
Their median home value and per capita income are less than the deep
blue counties and somewhat larger than the deep red counties. Their median
household income is almost the same as the loyal Democratic base and the loyal
Republican base. Their percent below the poverty line fits almost exactly between
the two partisan types as the swing counties are at 3.5 percent below the blue
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counties and 2.5 percent above the red counties. If the swing counties are
candidates ripe for a conversion to the Republican side, their demographic makeup would most resemble the red counties already. But they mostly fit between
the two polar types and thus they will probably continue to provide potential
movement to either side and help provide the margin of victory in any particular
election. The swing counties will continue to provide change in Illinois politics
while the partisan base counties will provide the continuity that is so evident
when the state’s entire map is considered.
The income disparities we found in these Illinois counties are also indicative
of some of the economic disparities which were important markers for the
national presidential results in 2016 as well. A study done after the election by
the Brookings Institution revealed the following about the Trump and Clinton
coalitions and the economic base to this deep division:
“The less than 500 counties that Clinton carried nationwide encompassed a
massive 64% of America’s economic activity as measured by total output in 2015.
By contrast the more than 2,000 counties that Donald Trump won generated just
36% of the country’s output- just a little more than one-third of the nation’s
economic activity…. You can see very clearly that with the exceptions of Phoenix
and Fort Worth areas and a big chunk of Long Island Clinton won every large-sized
county economy in the country. Her base of 493 counties was heavily
metropolitan. By contrast, Trumpland consists of hundreds and hundreds of tiny
low-output locations that compromise the non-metropolitan hinterland of
America, along with some suburban and exurban metro counties…In the end, our
data makes plain that while cultural resentments played a huge role in this
month’s election, so too did a massive economic divide between relatively
prosperous high-output counties and struggling lower out{put} rural ones” (Muro
and Liu, November 29, 2016; See also: Tankersley, November 22, 2016).
The report further showed that those counties with the higher GDP per
capita incomes and those with the most population density were much more
likely to vote for Clinton and those at the opposite ends of the income and
population continuum were where Trump carried overwhelmingly.
This is not a recent division in American politics and in many respects it is
an echo of the ancient divisions which roiled the debate over the ratification of
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the constitution, the power of the central government, states’ rights and tariff
policies in the era of the founders. For example, the Northeast was deeply
divided against the South, especially Virginia in the earliest government under
George Washington. The northeastern states generally favored a strong central
government and high tariffs while the south favored states’ rights and low tariffs.
The philosophical debates, and practical politics which divided New Yorker,
Alexander Hamilton, against Virginians, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison,
helped shape the early days of the republic and they drove the fundamental
conflicts and compromises embedded in the constitution. These divisions also
exacerbated the conflict which led to the Civil War. It is a division which seems to
have grown more clearly polarized in recent decades and to have reached an
extreme in the 2016 elections.
Urban demographer, Richard Florida provides a further elaboration on the
economic base of the Trump victory nationally in the following assessment:
“U. S. metro areas house more than 85 percent of the nation’s population
and generate 90 percent of its economic output….Donald Trump won many more
metros, 259 to 122, than Hillary Clinton. But Clinton captured a greater share of
the metro vote, 51 percent compared to 44% for Trump. Metro areas accounted
for 85 percent of total votes, 110 million of roughly 130 million total. Clinton
captured the largest metros. She bested Trump with 55 percent compared to 40
percent of the vote in metros with more than one million people, and won eight
of the ten largest metros. These metros accounted for more than half the vote
and generate two-thirds of America’s economic output…. The average Clinton
metro is home to almost 1.4 million people, more than three times the size of the
average Trump metro, which is about 420,000. And outside of metropolitan
areas, Trump beat Clinton… by 67 percent compared to 29 percent in rural areas…
(Florida, November 29, 2016).
In Illinois, the metropolitan areas are mostly found in northeastern Illinois,
in Chicago and the suburbs. Both Cook County and DuPage County were included
in the high economic output counties that Muro and Liu wrote about in their
study for Brookings. We have already noted the deep divisions in Illinois between
the Chicago area and the more rural and small city areas of the state in the
Clinton versus Trump race results. In many ways the appeal to regional loyalties
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has been the signature urban versus rural division that has marked Illinois for
generations and which seem to be increasing in depth and bitterness. It is now a
given that Illinois political campaigns outside Chicagoland will be powered by
appeals to the pervasive and deep seated suspicion, distrust and dislike of
Chicago and its most prominent leaders.
In southern Illinois, for example, office seekers from both parties will
routinely and vehemently state their determination to “stand up to Chicago” or
“fight the Chicago machine” or some other emphatic declaration indicating their
determination to focus their fight on the perceived dominance of the city and to
throw off the yoke of having to carry the city’s burdens whether those are
budgetary or regulatory. The fact that the last three governors, one Republican
and two Democrats, have come from Chicago lends credence to this charge. In
addition, the fact that the Speaker of the House, Michael J. Madigan, has held his
office for 31 of the past 33 years certainly provides a prominent target for
downstate politicians to blame.
In this last election the whole campaign in many legislative districts boiled
down to a proxy war between Governor Rauner and Speaker Madigan. Most of
the television commercials, and the ubiquitous campaign mailers brought that
narrative into the homes of Illinois voters on a daily basis. Those ads were often
explicitly directed against Chicago and the political leaders from there and also
contained explicit ways in which the opponent had “sold out” to Chicago.
The people in the heartland outside the city are often told by their leaders
that Chicago gets “more than their share” of the state budget and other
resources. This refrain is certainly deeply embedded in the culture of southern
Illinois and it is a staple of campaigns for both parties. It is not particularly
relevant whether this charge is fact based, and most budgetary experts do not
believe that it is. Such systematic empirical studies that have been done show
that Chicago pays more into the state’s coffers than they receive back in state
compensation (Legislative Research Unit, 1989; Perlstein, December 4, 2016, 1;
Rado, December 4, 2016, 1-A). Those studies show the predictable result, which
is that those areas which are more prosperous, and have the highest incomes, pay
disproportionately into the state’s coffers on the revenue side. On the
expenditure side, those studies also show that many of the state aid formulas are
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geared toward those individuals and areas which have low incomes and a greater
need. Thus, the formulas work to the advantage of the more rural and low income
areas and work also to the advantage of low income areas of the city of Chicago.
But the more prosperous areas of the city and the suburbs often pay more than
they receive in return.
This picture of rampant regionalism is also a microcosm of the nation as a
whole and is one key to what happened nationally in the 2016 presidential
campaign. Scholars have long noted that the red states are usually the recipients
of a disproportionate share of federal funds while the blue states are often the
disproportionate donors (WalletHub, March 27, 2014; Merda, March 26, 2014;
Illinois Economic Policy Institute, August 21, 2015). Ironically, the red states are
usually the more conservative states where the distrust and suspicion of the
federal government is greatest and support for smaller government and less
government spending is strongest.
This disparity is because of higher incomes and the more prosperous urban
areas pay more income and other taxes and the programmatic distribution
formulas usually take need into account. In addition defense department
spending is usually higher in the red states than in the blue states. They are home
to more defense industries and to more military bases. This is one reason Illinois,
for example, is a donor state that pays $1.36 in federal taxes for each federal
dollar it gets back (Progress Illinois, February 10, 2015). This anomaly demands
some attempt to understand why the rural areas feel so strongly that they are not
getting their “fair share” and why they feel exploited by the urban areas where
there are often pockets of poverty, crime and joblessness that rivals anything
experienced in the most deprived of our rural areas where the need is also great
for some people.
A recent book by political scientist, Katherine J. Cramer, offers some
important clues to understanding the anomaly of urban versus rural conflict and
pervasive feelings of anxiety and economic threat in the rural areas. She studied
her state of Wisconsin trying to understand the phenomenon of Governor Scott
Walker and his battles with the state’s civil servants and unions. This included the
impeachment vote in 2012, led by the state’s public sector unions whom Walker
had targeted for a greatly diminished role in state government with restrictions
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on their power passed entirely with the support of a Republican majority in the
state legislature and over the very strong objections of the Democrats (Cramer,
2016).
This fight led to a recall election, which Walker won, with the help of
campaign funds from the Koch brothers among other out of state sources, the
first time an American governor had successfully fended off such a recall
challenge. This victory, then made Walker something of a hero in conservative
and Republican Party circles and led in turn to his seeking the Republican
nomination for president in 2016 although he did not get very far.
Cramer is a Wisconsin native, who has lived most of her life in the state and
was educated in the state’s schools and now teaches political science at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison. Given that background, she was well aware of
the state’s political culture which included a constant tension between Madison
and Milwaukee versus the more rural outstate regions. The rural areas and some
of the suburbs of Milwaukee became the bastion of the pro Walker and antiunion battle that took place in the recall election and that division still marks
much of Wisconsin’s political culture. It is also a key to an understanding of
Clinton’s unexpected loss of Wisconsin to Trump in 2016 despite the fact that that
state had not voted Republican in the presidential races since 1984.
Veteran observers of the political scene in Illinois will be impressed with
just how similar that rural versus urban dynamic in Wisconsin is to the major
divisions and narratives which move the political tides in Illinois. The rural/urban
divide is, if anything, more long standing and deeper in Illinois than in Wisconsin.
Cramer undertook a long running series of in depth conversations with the people
of the rural areas of her home state to try to understand why they had so much
fear and distrust of the two major cities of their state. What she found was a
constant refrain of what she called a “rural consciousness” i.e. a strong emphasis
on the place where the people live and how much their own identities were
wrapped up in their native regions, their home towns, and their sense of who
they were personally being defined by the culture of where they live. At the
aggregate level, Cramer maintains that this has become a sort of “rural identity
politics” which goes to the essence of how people personally identify themselves
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and how they think of their place in the world. Anyone who has spent much time
listening to country music will immediately recognize this story.
This is a refrain that is also found in other major works which have tried to
untangle the dynamics of the profound geographical divisions which have marked
recent history in our polarized nation (Bishop, 2008; Frey, December 13, 2016).
We tend to live in geographic enclaves that help define who we are politically and
how we vote as well. One cannot view the red versus blue maps of recent
presidential elections, especially the 2016 results, and not be struck by just how
indelibly geography and regionalism have come to mark our electoral fate.
It would be hard to overestimate how much what Cramer terms “the
politics of resentment” fueled the Trump surge which carried him to victory in the
nation as well as in ninety of the one hundred and two Illinois counties. His
rhetoric was stark, unvarnished, and ultimately remarkably effective. In the
Trump narrative immigrants or Mexicans or the Chinese were coming to get your
job, and some were criminals who could take your life. Urban black people lived
in hellish ghettoes marred by dysfunctional schools and no economic opportunity,
drugs, gangs and violence which constantly threatened to spill over to your more
prosperous suburban or rural homes and life. Political and economic elites
negotiated trade agreements which flittered away American jobs and prosperity
with no gains for Americans in return. International elites lured us into
international environmental agreements to reduce carbon dioxide at the expense
of carbon based extractive jobs in the coal and oil businesses at home. The media
and Hollywood elites controlled television and the movies that purveyed new
cultural images and norms which undermined your family values and threatened
your freedom of religion. Your free speech rights are constantly threatened by
political correctness. Welfare cheats are getting free cell phones compliments of
Obama and getting free healthcare thanks to Obamacare.
Finally, the perennial NRA threat that someone, Obama and next Clinton, is
coming to get your guns and confiscate them so some nebulous national
dictatorship or world government can be established. This story is always being
pushed by the NRA and other gun rights groups, even though there is no evidence
that Obama took away any guns during the eight years he was president. Clinton
repeatedly stressed her support for the Second Amendment during the debates,
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although she did consider the possibility of closing the gun show loopholes and
restricting gun magazine capacities as small steps toward trying to control gun
violence, particularly involving children. Trump often pledged his total allegiance
to the 2nd Amendment and promised that no one would tamper with it if he was
president. Unrestrained gun rights, rather than Medicare or Social Security, may
have become the new “third rail” of American electoral politics especially in the
more rural and small town precincts of the country.
None of these narratives have to be true, or to have more than a small
kernel of facts to back them up, to nevertheless be remarkably effective from a
rhetorical standpoint in convincing the recipients of the message and to reinforce
the inchoate attitudes that are already in place for millions of voters. That is why
the politics of resentment apparently proved to be such fertile ground with an
audience of tens of millions during the 2016 campaign.
When the 2016 race for the White House started this narrative was already
out there in the nation deeply engrained and shared widely in private
conversations and exploding in the new social media. All Trump had to do initially
was to articulate it and spread it directly and immediately especially through his
own unprecedented and aggressive use of the social media. He was especially
adept at delivering his message through his unmediated and wildly successful use
of Twitter- a channel which carried his words without interruption or filter to an
audience which numbered twenty million personal followers by his own report
and tens of millions more in the larger mainstream media and an internet based
audience which heard what he had to say posted directly every day of the
campaign. Trump’s clarion call to the politics of resentment struck a mass nerve
for many of the more than sixty million people who voted for him on November
8th. As the map has shown, many millions of those voters were in the rural, small
town and small city precincts of America.
Digging below the fact of the division that she observed in Wisconsin well
before Trump’s arrival on the national scene, Cramer tried to respectfully
understand the rural informants she interviewed and to fathom the depths of
their mistrust and dislike of their city cousins. In these interviews, she
consistently encountered a narrative containing a core of this politics of
resentment. It was anchored in an “us versus them” conviction that the two
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worlds were greatly different and that the city people were getting more than
their share while the rural people were getting the short end of the stick. This
made them resent government and to want less government, whether state or
national, because the major beneficiaries of government would be the urban
areas and the undeserving people who lived in them. The conviction that
immigrants and minorities were taking most of whatever there was to get from
governmental programs made them want to reduce the size and scope of
government at all levels.
Again, never mind that those were not the empirical facts in Wisconsin; the
people Cramer interviewed took them as indisputable truths that they
understood clearly. Those “facts” are especially reinforced in the public’s minds
when some of their leaders are elected on platforms that promise to take care of
the forgotten places and people and to reduce the power of the political elites
who perpetuate a system which is rigged against the alienated and distrustful
voters. Scott Walker himself had been the chief executive of the county
Milwaukee is located in before he was elected governor, but he successfully
mobilized this mistrust toward and resentment of the urban areas in his two
elections for governor and in his recall fight.
Cramer summarizes her major thesis in the following terms:
“This book shows making sense of politics in a way that places resentment
toward other citizens at the center. It illuminates this politics of resentment by
looking closely at the manner in which many rural residents exhibit an intense
resentment against their urban counterparts…. I explain how people make sense
of politics when the boundaries they draw between ‘us’ and ‘them’ coincides with
real geographic boundaries. I show that although this form of thinking is often
criticized as ignorance, these understandings are complex, many layered, and
grounded in fundamental identities” (Cramer, 2016, Chapter 1).
One need not be a political expert or even an aficionado or political junkie
to be struck by how well Cramer’s thesis fits Illinois politics. The narrative that
many of our ills are the fault of Chicago, the “machine,” or the leaders we elect
from Chicago is a powerful one in much of Downstate. It has been vividly
reinforced by tens of millions of campaign dollars spent on purveying that
narrative in the 2016 elections. It is a narrative that has deep roots in southern
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Illinois, for example, but also throughout the rest of Downstate. Regionalism, an
appeal to the sense of neglect of the locals and of “us versus them” has a
powerful appeal as anyone who spent any amount of time viewing the flood of
political ads on broadcast or cable television, or even in front of a computer
screen or on a smart phone can attest. Indeed, in the southern Illinois media
market which covers much of southeast Missouri and western Kentucky, it is a
narrative repeated with even more color and vehemence in those neighboring
states. The politics of regionalism in Illinois looks strikingly like the contours of
politics in Wisconsin described in Cramer’s meticulously researched book.
Conclusion
Which returns the discussion back to the recently concluded national
elections. The thesis of this paper is that Illinois is a good microcosm of national
tides by virtue of its standing as a bellwether state and one of the most
representative of all the states in demographic, economic, and political indicators.
The fact that Hillary Clinton won her native state handily while losing the
presidency does not diminish this important distinction for Illinois. Our
population distribution closely reflects the national distribution; our economy has
exhibited and suffered from the same strains and dislocations that have
challenged the national economy in a time of globalized competition and our
recent demographic changes are a bellwether for the nation. Our political parties
and factions and interest group complex are very much like their national
counterparts.
The argument of the last section of this paper is that the regionalism and
geographic divisions overlay and reinforce the political divisions. In the
presidential elections geography is destiny because the Electoral College requires
a state coalition based voting majority rather than a majority of the popular votes
and emphasizes the power of the Electoral College to overturn the will of a
majority or plurality of the people. In short, most Americans have learned in two
of the most recent presidential elections that unlike all other elections in this
country, the candidate who gets the most votes does not necessarily win the
prize.
One cannot view the red and blue national map and not be impressed, or
depressed, by the deep geographic and regional divisions which marked the 2016
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election results. If the lens is taken out to a wider angle, one cannot view all the
presidential results in the modern era without being impressed by how much the
realignment of the political parties has congealed and hardened into maturity and
the ideological and cultural wars have served to reflect and exacerbate the deep
divisions in a now polarized country.
Certainly the divided results of 2016, with Trump winning a handy victory in
the Electoral College while Clinton took a substantial popular vote margin, will
continue to emphasize and exacerbate those divisions. The divisive rhetoric of
that campaign will not go away if and when the tone in Washington softens in
service to the need to govern. The divisions are deep and will only be reduced
and ameliorated when there are tangible results where the system seems to be
more responsive and the economic and social benefits are unmistakably the
product of a government which serves the greater good and the interests of the
greatest number of the people.
In the wake of the 2016 results there is a developing national dialogue
about the Electoral College and whether it is outmoded and ought to be repealed.
This dialogue also developed in 2000 when the same divided results put George
W. Bush in the White House despite his losing the popular vote by some 537,000
votes. The vagaries of the Electoral College, the Florida recount, and the
intervention of the U. S. Supreme Court were more complex than the rather
direct and swift settlement of the presidential election in 2016, but the final result
was the same. Clinton’s popular vote margin was much wider than Gore’s, but her
Electoral College loss was also much larger. In fact the discrepancy between the
popular vote and the electoral vote and the disadvantage to the popular vote
winner has never been as great as it was in 2016.
There will be a continued national interest in doing away with the Electoral
College, mostly led by the Democrats and liberals who believe that the 18th
Century device denies majority rule, one of the bedrock tenants of democracy
(Editorial Board, New York Times, December 19, 2016). However, there is
virtually no chance that this drive to delete the Electoral College from the
constitution will succeed in the foreseeable future. The Electoral College has
unfailingly worked to the advantage of the Republican Party in all cases where it
chose the president except 1824 when the Republican Party did not exist. The
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two modern cases, 2000 and 2016, both produced Republican presidents over
Democratic candidates who had won the popular vote as did the elections of
1876 and 1888. Because their votes are distributed so much more efficiently
across the states, there is an inherent and long term bias in the Republicans’
favor. The Electoral College votes are allotted on population as reflected in the
number of House members a state has, but that is supplemented by two votes for
each state to represent the Senate numbers. Thus, voters in a small state like
Montana, for example, are worth more in the total equation than are the voters
in the larger states like California and New York. This advantage to the rural and
small states is built in and works to one party’s advantage. This advantage is most
important and most marked in the U. S. Senate, but it also counts in the Electoral
College.
One of the most influential textbooks in the field describes the situation in
the following manner:
“…the ten smallest states, with 3 percent of the total voters in the 2012
presidential election, maintain voting weight in the Senate equal to the ten
largest states, home to 50 percent of the voters in 2012. The small states’
disproportionate share of senators guarantees them slight overrepresentation in
the electoral college as well. After the 2010 census, the seven states casting three
electoral votes each had a ratio of 331,472 or fewer residents per electoral vote,
while every state with thirteen or more electoral votes had a ratio of 607,972 or
more residents per electoral vote” (Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, 2016,
220).
This book goes on to add, however, that because the small states are
mostly one party states, it is the swing states or the most competitive states
which get the most campaign attention and the most resources because they can
and often do shift the balance of power in a competitive election (See also:
Edwards, November 18, 2016). Thus the battleground states get the candidate
attention and campaign expenditures that all of the other states would like to
have.
Since it takes thirty-eight states to amend the constitution, the Electoral
College is certainly safe as a fundamental rule about how we elect American
presidents. In addition, philosophically the Republicans and conservatives
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contend that the Electoral College helps protect and foster federalism since a
candidate must win a coalition of states which produces a majority of electors
rather than a majority (or plurality) of the popular votes. The polarization of
American politics will continue to be driven in part by the uneven distribution of
the national vote results across very urban versus very rural states and regions
within the states which the Electoral College magnifies.
Both parties will be challenged by those deep-seated differences as they try
to chart their own futures and plan for the future of the nation under a newly
unified Republican government. In fact unified Republican control of the
government is likely to be a much more important driver of the changes that
Trump promised than is his singular election will be. Given their different national
power equations now, the challenges to the two major parties will be quite
different also. The Democrats have a profound long-term challenge to rebuild
across all levels of government and in all the states and regions where they lost
ground in 2016 and 2012. They must try to overcome some of those broad based
losses and try to expand their appeal to the voters, especially the millions who
claimed that they were angry toward their government, and took out that anger
on the Democrats generically and Hillary Clinton specifically in 2016. They will also
have to greatly improve their appeal to blue collar workers and the growing
numbers of people who work in the service industries, whether blue collar or
white collar, which increasingly dominate our economy.
The Democrats will have to face the inevitable struggle of the two wings
where the left, under the leadership of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren will
try to take the party in a more markedly progressive direction. The liberals will
often be opposed by the more pragmatic and middle of the road leaders who
once were represented by Bill Clinton and Al Gore’s taking the party toward the
middle or what was called “the Third Way” and trying to accommodate the
seemingly irreconcilable demands of Wall Street and Main Street.
The results of the 2016 election make it clear that the Democrats will have
to learn to appeal to more white voters, more male voters, and older voters
demographically. Geographically, they will have to find a way to appeal again to
the rural areas and to small town America. Clearly the rural areas cannot be
ceded to the Republicans permanently without doing real damage to the long
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term prospects of the Democratic Party, especially in the House, and ensuring the
continued deep polarization of the nation (Jaffey, November 28, 2016; Roarty,
November 29, 2016).
The Democrats will also have to refresh and reinforce their message to the
traditional blue states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and also to the
swing states like Florida and Ohio that they will need for success in future
presidential elections. There are a number of “purple states” like Colorado,
Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Virginia where the Democrats must build on
some of their recent state and national successes. They have also recently found
a sympathetic audience in many parts of suburban America, and especially among
the growing number of better educated and young voters. Those are the Collar
Counties in Illinois and almost all states have some version of these vote rich and
growing suburban areas which were once Republican bastions, but which are now
much more diverse and trending at least purple and sometimes blue in many
areas. Those are key components for any plan for a return to majority status and
control of any measure of political power for the Democrats.
They must rebuild the party at the state level where their losses are
especially widespread and where those losses will have results throughout the
decade of 2020-2030 if the Democrats do not start rebuilding at the state and
local levels in anticipation of the need to gain control of the redistricting process
in a wider number of states than they have had since the 2010 election losses
which devastated the Democrats at the grassroots level. To do this they cannot
give up on rural, small town and small city America since those areas are so
important for the state legislative and congressional seats that are essential for
the party’s future-particularly when the 2021 redistricting battles take place.
Somehow the Democrats have to refocus the constant ‘zero sum game’
mentality which has taken control of many voters, the parties, the media and the
nation. That is, they have to convince larger numbers of people that when the
government works well, and public programs are effective and produce tangible
gains everyone prospers. This is an old message about the irreplaceable functions
of the government that cannot and will not be supplied by the private sector.
Such a message should have particular appeal to the middle class and working
class constituencies that the Democrats traditionally served. More importantly,
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they have to convince more voters that this message about the importance of
government for ordinary people is based in reality and that their interest and the
national interest do not have to be in fundamental conflict constantly. This was
the message of the Clinton campaign, summarized in her “Stronger Together”
motto, but they failed to deliver it in a convincing form for tens of millions of
voters who had favored the Democrats as recently as Bill Clinton’s two terms and
even through Obama’s terms, but who did not hear a compelling reason to stay
the course with Hillary Clinton.
Right now the challenge to the Republicans is much easier to manage and
more long range than immediate. Nothing succeeds like success in politics and
the GOP enjoyed major successes at both the national level and in many states on
November 8th. The Republicans will not be marked by the deep internal divisions
that clearly existed before the presidential election because their side and Trump
won. Republican leaders who stridently opposed and criticized him before the
election are now rushing to make amends and some are being touted as new
members of his cabinet.
Trump might have said, “recrimination is for losers,” (but didn’t so far as I
know). The Republican leaders, especially Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell, will go
along because they want to get along with their new party leader, Donald Trump.
Whether they like it or not, the Chief Executive is also the Chief of the Party. The
legislative leaders have a long list of laws and policy demands that they want
implemented immediately, starting with the repeal of the Affordable Care Act on
the domestic front and repeal of the Iranian nuclear deal and the Paris climate
control agreement on the international front. The legislative leaders will help
Trump drive the Republican agenda and define the new Republican Party. The
proof will be in whether they succeed in governing with a broad constituency in
mind and whether Donald Trump will prove to be as capable at governing, and
learning the art of compromise and adopting a give and take style as he was in
campaigning and defining a new norm for what constitutes presidential politics in
21st Century America. We will see. Time will tell.
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Cook

Lee
Kendall

Rock Island

Grundy

Mercer

Putnam

Henderson

Stark

Hancock

Kankakee

Marshall

Knox

Warren

Livingston
Woodford

Peoria

McDonough

Tazewell

Fulton

Iroquois

Ford

McLean

Mason

Schuyler
Adams

Will

LaSalle

Bureau

Henry

De Witt

Logan

Vermilion

Menard

Cass

Brown

Champaign
Piatt

Macon
Scott
Christian

Coles
Shelby

Greene
Macoupin
Calhoun

Montgomery

Jersey

Cumberland
Effingham

Fayette

Crawford
Lawrence

Clay

Richland

Marion

Clinton
St. Clair

Wayne
Washington

Monroe
Randolph

LEGEND

Jasper

Clark

Bond

Madison

Illinois Presidential Popular
Vote by County in 2000,
2004, 2008, 2012, 2016

Edgar

Moultrie

Edwards

Pike

Douglas

Sangamon

Jefferson

Perry

Hamilton

White

Saline

Gallatin

Wabash

Morgan

Franklin
Jackson

Williamson

Union

Johnson

Pulaski

Pope

Hardin

Massac

Alexander

REPUBLICAN
DEMOCRAT

*Voted Democrat at least one election
** Voted Republican each election, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016
(except Franklin and Perry who voted for Gore in 2000 and then
consistently for the GOP starting in 2004.)

County
Cook
Rock Island
Peoria
Champaign
St. Clair
Jackson
Average

Appendix H
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Consistently Democratic Counties*
2010
%
%
Median
Per Capita Median Household % below
Population % White Black Hispanic Home Value
Income
Income
Poverty
5,194,675
66.0 25.0
24.4
256,900
29,920
54,598
15.8
147,546
85.9
9.3
11.9
113,100
25,609
46,726
12.4
186,494
75.7 17.9
4.0
121,900
28,743
50,689
15.4
201,081
74.9 12.7
5.5
147,800
25,226
44,462
21.8
270,056
65.8 30.5
3.4
126,300
25,475
50,109
16.3
60,218
78.5 14.7
4.3
95,100
19,619
32,896
29.1
1,010,012
74.5 18.4
8.9
143,517
25,765
46,580
18.5
*Note: These counties voted for the Democratic presidential Candidate 2000-2016

Appendix I
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Loyal Republican Counties
County
Adams
Bond
Brown
Christian
Clark
Clay
Clinton
Crawford
Cumberland
Dewitt
Douglas
Edgar
Edwards
Effingham
Fayetteville
Ford
*Franklin
Greene
Hamilton
Hancock
Hardin
Iroquois
Jasper
Jefferson
Jersey
Johnson
Lawrence
Lee
Livingston
Logan
Marion
Marshall
Massac
Menard
Monroe
Morgan
Moultrie
Ogle
*Perry
Piatt
Pike
Pope
Randolph
Richland
Saline
Scott
Shelby

2010
%
%
%
Median
Population White Black Hispanic Home Value
67,103
93.9
3.6
1.3
99,900
17,768
91.3
6.5
3.2
107,300
6,937
78.6 19.0
5.9
80,000
34,800
96.7
1.7
1.5
82,000
16,335
98.2
0.5
1.3
84,700
13,815
97.9
0.5
1.3
71,500
37,762
94.3
3.8
2.9
125,200
19,817
93.3
4.9
2.1
70,000
11,048
98.0
0.7
0.9
82,100
16,561
97.5
0.7
2.2
104,400
19,900
97.7
0.6
6.4
95,000
18,576
98.3
0.6
1.2
72,400
6,721
98.0
0.7
1.0
61,500
34,242
98.2
0.4
1.9
108,100
22,140
93.9
4.6
1.5
78,400
14,081
97.6
0.9
2.4
89,900
39,561
97.7
0.5
1.4
63,200
13,886
97.8
1.1
0.9
71,800
8,457
98.1
0.6
1.4
74,100
19,104
98.0
0.4
1.1
81,700
4,320
97.5
0.5
1.4
65,700
29,718
97.2
1.0
5.7
99,400
9,698
98.4
0.3
0.9
82,700
38,827
88.7
8.7
2.2
87,000
22,985
97.5
0.5
1.1
120,800
12,582
89.9
8.5
3.1
93,400
16,833
88.5 10.0
3.5
68,300
36,031
92.4
5.2
5.1
114,700
38,950
92.8
5.2
4.1
105,600
30,305
89.8
7.9
3.1
95,700
39,437
93.5
4.1
1.5
71,300
12,640
98.0
0.5
2.7
103,200
15,429
91.5
5.9
2.0
80,500
12,705
97.6
0.9
1.1
115,200
32,957
98.1
0.4
1.4
201,300
35,547
91.2
6.3
2.2
93,000
14,846
98.3
0.5
1.0
93,000
53,497
89.8
1.1
9.1
153,400
22,350
88.9
8.8
2.8
76,600
16,729
97.9
0.6
1.2
122,200
16,430
96.9
1.8
1.1
75,300
4,470
91.4
6.7
1.5
87,400
33,476
88.4 10.0
2.7
88,700
16,233
97.3
0.7
1.4
7,600
24,913
93.0
4.3
1.6
69,400
5,355
98.6
0.2
0.9
83,100
22,363
98.5
0.5
1.0
86,500

Per Capita
Income
24,798
24,166
19,704
3,125
24,388
21,577
26,380
23,387
21,715
25,914
22,339
23,897
20,907
25,566
22,419
25,302
19,668
22,366
22,471
23,027
18,749
24,563
22,917
22,032
24,940
17,328
17,050
25,303
23,530
22,136
21,418
25,600
20,044
26,300
31,570
23,598
24,078
25,803
18,469
27,452
20,383
20,603
21,442
23,922
21,626
27,955
22,522

Median Household % Below
Income
Poverty
45,792
12.7
50,672
10.5
42,014
12.1
43,964
15.8
47,933
10.2
38,905
16.9
57,246
8.0
43,923
16.4
43,255
13.1
48,750
7.9
47,921
10.2
42,947
14.9
39,071
11.5
50,938
10.7
43,081
16.8
50,332
9.2
36,383
18.5
42,193
12.8
39,000
10.0
43,567
12.8
30,875
23.8
48,248
11.5
47,731
7.6
42,679
17.2
54,469
8.9
42,172
11.6
38,326
16.2
49,451
9.5
52,835
10.7
48,714
11.1
40,097
16.5
51,642
9.3
40,885
16.7
56,943
7.9
69,291
5.6
44,731
15.0
48,982
10.5
57,094
10.3
41,333
17.0
58,837
6.5
40,668
16.2
38,651
11.9
46,148
12.4
42,305
13.4
36,083
17.0
50,702
8.0
44,689
10.5

County
Alexander
Carroll
Fulton
Henderson
Henry
Jo Davies
Knox
Mercer
Putnam
Warren
Whiteside
Average

Appendix J
Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2012 and Lost by Clinton in 2016
2010
Median Home
Per Capita
Median Household
% Below
Population % White % Black % Hispanic
Value
Income
Income
Poverty
8,238
60.9
35.4
1.9
52,800
14,052
25,495
35.6
15,387
96.9
0.8
2.8
97,000
26,918
49,629
12.6
37,069
93.4
3.4
2.4
81,300
22,478
45,938
16.5
7,331
98.2
0.2
1.1
86,300
27,132
48,438
11.7
50,486
94.8
1.6
4.8
110,100
26,845
52,518
11.3
22,678
97.2
0.5
2.7
137,200
29,477
52,065
10.7
52,919
87.5
7.2
4.8
80,800
22,273
39,800
19.3
16,434
98.3
0.3
1.9
93,700
26,739
51,259
9.6
6,006
96.6
0.5
4.2
123,800
28,158
55,360
8.9
17,707
91.3
1.7
8.4
82,000
22,923
43,683
13.5
58,498
92.2
1.3
11.0
99,200
24,815
48,343
12.2
26,614
91.6
4.8
4.2
94,927
24,710
46,593
15.0
Note: Obama carried 23 counties in 2012: Clinton carried 11 in 2016
Note: All above data was obtained from the 2010 Census conducted by the US Census Bureau

